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Abstract 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the causality relations between bank performance and 
economic growth in a panel including 27 European Union member-states from 1996 through to the 
onset of the 2008 financial crisis. Bank performance is represented not only by the Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) ratios but also by bank cost efficiency, measured through Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). For economic growth, we consider not only the GDP per capita but 
also the gross fixed capital formation growth. Deploying a panel Granger causality approach, we 
confirm positive causality running from bank performance to economic growth. However, as regards 
the opposite causality, running from growth to bank performance, we conclude that economic growth 
positively contributes to the bank ROA and ROE ratios but not so certainly in the case of the DEA 
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1. Introduction  
The contribution of financial development to economic growth has been extensively analysed and 
empirically tested in recent decades and most especially after the King and Levine (1993) 
contribution.  
In spite of controversy over the variables introduced to represent financial development and the 
appropriate estimation techniques, most empirical studies do conclude that financial development 
promotes economic growth and advocating that a smoothly functioning financial sector contributes 
to the mobilization of savings, the diversification of risk and a better allocation of financial resources. 
Although less analysed, there is also a strand of literature (represented by Greenwood and Bruce, 
1997, among others) that studies the inverse relationship and thereby approaching how economic 
growth fosters financial development because growth in the real economy increases demand for 
financial services and thus contributes to the sector’s development. 
Hence, in spite of the fact that many authors concur on the actual importance of the relationship 
between financial development and economic growth, the direction of causality still remains a 
controversial issue.  
Granger causality tests might prove highly relevant to establishing the direction of this relationship 
and have recently been applied by Hassan et al. (2011), Bangake and Eggoh (2011), Kar et al. (2011) 
and Abdelhafidh (2013), among others, to different subsets of developed and/or developing country 
economies in conjunction with the respective and now to a greater or lesser extent traditional proxies 
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for portraying economic growth (such as bank credits, deposits or bank liabilities). Their conclusions 
differ whether in terms of the kind of countries, the time interval considered and the variables applied 
but, generally speaking, they confirm that the causality running from financial development to 
economic growth proves easier to demonstrate than the opposite causality running from economic 
growth to financial development. 
 
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate on the causality relationship between finance and growth 
using a panel Granger causality approach and departing from recent empirical work in order to 
complement the evidence existing, especially in the following terms: 
 We consider a panel including the 27 European Union member states over a relatively long 
timeframe, from 1996 through to the onset of the 2008 financial crisis; 
 We take into account the dominant role of banking institutions in the European financial sector 
and instead of using traditional proxies for representing financial development, we test the specific 
relationship between bank performance and economic growth; 
  We approach bank performance by the usual Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity 
(ROE) ratios in addition to measures of bank efficiency obtained by Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA); 
 For economic growth, we consider not only the commonly applied per capita Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) but also the investment channelled into growth in addition to the gross fixed capital 
formation. 
 
The results obtained clearly confirm the positive causality of bank performance on economic growth. 
As regards the opposite causality, from growth to bank performance, whilst there are no doubts that 





This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the relevant literature, section 3 explains the 





2. Relevant literature  
The link between economic growth and the quality of financial systems dates back at least as far as 
Schumpeter (1911), who maintained that the services provided by financial intermediaries prove 
essential to economic innovation, productive investment and economic growth. Over the last century, 
this question has been subject to theoretical debates and empirical studies, which rose in particular in 
the wake of the renowned King and Levine (1993) paper.  
According to most studies, financial development plays an important role in economic growth as 
well-functioning markets and financial institutions are identified as decreasing transaction costs and 
problems over asymmetric information levels. At the same time, financial institutions act to identify 
investment opportunities by selecting the most profitable projects, mobilizing savings, facilitating 
trade and the diversification of risk while also improving corporate governance mechanisms. 
In one such study, Levine and Zervos (1998), applying data for 49 countries for the 1976-1990 period, 
point out a strong correlation between the rates of real per-capita output growth and stock market 
liquidity. In another work, Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (1999), with data for 150 countries spanning 
the 1990s, conclude that wealthy countries have better developed financial systems, characterising 
this development in terms of the size and the efficiency of the financial sector, measured by the assets, 
liabilities, overhead costs and interest rate margins.  
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A few years later, Beck et al. (2004) deployed the ratio between credits from financial intermediaries 
to the private sector divided by GDP as a proxy to capture the depth and breadth of financial 
intermediation in a panel of 52 countries over the period 1960 to 1999. They conclude that financial 
development is not only clearly pro-growth but also pro-poor, thus, in countries with better-developed 
financial intermediation, income inequality declines more rapidly. 
Providing a review of the literature and the empirical evidence on the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth, Khan and Senhadji (2000) conclude that the results of empirical 
studies analysing the relationship between financial development and economic growth indicate that, 
while the general effects of financial development on the outputs may be positive, the size of these 
effects varies not only with the different variables considered, the financial development indicators 
but also with the estimation method, data frequency or the defined functional form of the relationship. 
On the other hand, there are authors like Stiglitz (1985), Bhide (1993), Bencivenga et al. (1995), who 
stressed that certain costs may stem from the role of financial intermediaries and correspondingly 
these intermediaries may also sometimes be subject to adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
that may constrain real economic growth through inhibiting resource allocation, exaggerating 
fluctuations in interest rates, or contributing to falls in the saving rates prevailing. 
Other authors, including Loayza and Rancière (2006), underline the importance of the time horizon, 
defending that, in the long term, the literature on economic growth finds a positive relationship 
between financial development and growth but, in the short term, the literature mostly on bank crises 
returns a negative relationship and concludes that monetary aggregates may represent good predictors 
of economic crisis. 
More recently, Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2012) apply a sample of developed and emerging economies 
to analyse how financial development affects aggregate productivity growth and conclude in favour 
of an inverted U-shaped financial development effect as it exerts a positive influence on productivity 
growth but only up to a certain point after which the influence on growth turns negative. Furthermore, 
6 
 
in focusing on advanced economies, these authors demonstrate that a fast-growing financial sector is 
detrimental to aggregate productivity growth. 
Ayadi et al. (2013) use a sample of northern and southern Mediterranean countries for the 1985-2009 
time period and conclude there are deficiencies in bank credit allocation in these countries as credit 
to the private sector and bank deposits are negatively associated to economic growth; however, on 
the stock market side, the results indicate that stock market size and liquidity do contribute to growth. 
Furthermore, these authors conclude both that poorer countries are catching up with richer countries 
in terms of GDP growth and that low inflation and the quality of institutions are key factors to growth. 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) had already pointed out that the positive correlation usually returned by 
financial development and economic growth might derive from a problem of omitted variables. They 
argued that there is no clear causality between financial development and economic growth and 
proposed further tests to analyse the mechanism through which financial development may promote 
economic growth taking into account both the country and sectorial effects. Thus, rather than adhering 
to the traditional explanation of economic growth by proxies of financial development, Rajan and 
Zingales (1998) test the hypothesis that financial markets and banking  institutions not only reduce 
the cost of financing but also help to combat problems provoked by asymmetrical information and 
correspondingly assuming in their test that those sectors most dependent on external financing 
represent those growing at the fastest pace and in line with the development of the financial markets 
and institutions to which these sectors have access. 
Recently, Greenwood et al. (2010, 2013) quantitatively analyse the impact of financial development 
on economic growth, deploying a state cost verification model and conclude that as financial sector 
efficiency rises, financial resources get redirected from the less productive firms to their more 
productive peers. This analytical approach was applied to both U.S. and cross-country data (more 
precisely, to a 45 country sample, first applied in Beck et al., 2000) and one key finding points to the 
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conclusion that world output might increase by 53 per cent if all countries adopt the best global 
financial practices.   
Koetter and Wedow (2010) study the importance of financial intermediation by banks to the economic 
growth taking place in 97 German economic planning regions between 1993 and 2004 and conclude 
that the quality of these banks, as reported by bank cost efficiency, robustly contributes to growth, 
while the quantity of bank credit provided does not clearly correlate with economic growth. The same 
kind of conclusions are obtained by Hasan et al. (2009) who study whether regional growth in eleven 
European countries gets influenced by bank costs and profit efficiency over the time period 1996-
2005. Their findings indicate how, in these countries, an increase in bank efficiency generates five 
times more influence on economic growth than the same rise in the level of bank credit provided. 
 
There is also a strand of the literature represented by authors like Robinson (1952), Gurley and Shaw 
(1967), Goldsmith (1969), Jung (1986), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Berthelemy and 
Varoudakis (1996), Greenwood and Bruce (1997) who remain unconvinced as to the one-way 
causality of financial development on economic growth and postulate that there may be a reverse 
causality between economic growth and financial development. Furthermore, other authors even 
assume that the relationship between financial development and economic growth represents a two-
way causality (among others, Patrick, 1966; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Blackburn and Hung, 
1998; Luintel and Khan, 1999; Khan, 2001; Shan et al., 2001; Calderon and Liu, 2003). 
Applying pooled data from 109 developing and industrial countries, for the period from 1960 to 1994, 
Calderon and Liu (2003) conclude not only that financial development generally leads to economic 
growth but also that the Granger causality from financial development to economic growth coexists 
with the Granger causality between economic growth and financial development. These authors also 
empirically demonstrate not only how financial deepening contributes greater to the causal 
relationships in developing countries but also that the longer the sampling interval, the larger the 
8 
 
impact of financial development on economic growth thereby positing that the effect of financial 
sector deepening on the real economy requires time to become evident while furthermore finding that 
even though financial development may enhance economic growth through both capital accumulation 
and productivity growth, the productivity channel would seem a stronger influence.  
More recently, Hassan et al. (2011) study how financial development links to economic growth 
through applying Granger causality tests for a sample period between 1980 and 2007, and 
categorizing low and middle income countries into six geographic regions: East Asia and the Pacific, 
Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, South 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa; and also two groups of high-income countries: OECD and non-OECD 
countries. Their findings point to the conclusion favouring evidence on the role of financial 
development in economic growth in low and middle income countries. More precisely, in the short 
run, there is two-way causality between financial development and economic growth, reported in all 
regions apart from Sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia and the Pacific. However, these latter two 
regions have causality running from economic growth to financial development supporting the 
hypothesis that in developing countries growth leads finance because of the increasing demand for 
financial services.  
At the same time, Bangake and Eggoh (2011) deploy panel methods and Granger causality on a 
dataset of 71 developed and developing countries over the relatively long time period of 1960-2004 
and conclude that there is long run bidirectional causality between financial development and 
economic growth across country groups. Nevertheless, in the short run, the situation is different and 
contradicts at least some of the Hassan et al. (2011) findings as regards low and middle income 
countries where there is no short run evidence of causality between finance and growth while in high 
income countries economic growth significantly affects financial development. 
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For a panel of fifteen Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, and the 1980-2007 time span, 
Kar et al. (2011) conclude that the causality between finance and economic growth mostly depends 
on the measurement of financial development and differs from country to country.    
Abdelhafidh (2013) returned the same kind of conclusion following analysis on the direction of 
causality interactions between finance and growth in a sample of North African countries for the 
1970-2008 time period. The general conclusion is that Granger economic growth raises domestic 
savings in these countries even though the findings point to specific country results, with unilateral 
and sometimes bilateral Granger causality relations between the different proxies for financial 
development and economic growth. They also underscore the policy implications of different 





3. Methodological framework and data sample 
In order to test the causality relationship between bank performance and economic growth we follow 
here the Granger causality concept (Granger, 1969) and the approaches developed to analyse the 
existence of causality relationships among variables in panels (by such authors as Holtz-Eakin et al., 
1988; Weinhold, 1996; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold 2001; Kónya, 2006; Hurlin and Venet, 2008; 
Bangake and Eggoh, 2011), using the general linear panel Granger causality model: 





















   
Where: y = dependent variable; x = explanatory variable; i = 1,...,N cross units; t = 1,...,T time periods; 
 = intercept; k = 1,...K lags;  = error term (including not only the disturbance term, but also the 
individual cross-unit specific effects). 
10 
 
To test Granger non-causality from x to y, the null hypothesis is NiH io ,...,1,0:   
The alternative hypothesis states that there is a causality relationship from x to y for at least one cross-
unit of the panel: )10(;...,2,1,0;,...,1,0: 11111  N
N
NNNiNiH ii  . 
 
Our sample comprises a panel in which the cross units are 27 EU countries (i = 1, …, 27) and the 
timeframe covers a relatively long period, from 1996 to the onset of the 2008 financial crisis (t = 
1996, …, 2008).  
 
Over the following pages, we set out the variables chosen to represent bank performance (return on 
assets, return on equity and bank cost efficiency) and economic growth (considering not only per 
capita GDP but also gross fixed capital formation). We also report the results of the unit root tests of 
the series studied.  
 
 
3.1. Bank performance 
We measure bank performance through two of the ratios commonly applied to analyse the banking 
sector performance: the return on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE); we also consider a 
measurement for bank efficiency (generated by Data Envelopment Analysis). All data for these three 
bank performance variables are sourced from the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD (annual data from the 




Return on assets 
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The ROA is the ratio of the net income to the total bank assets and serves to assess the efficiency of 
bank resource applications and their respective financial strength. Bank net income in itself provides 
a good indication of the bank’s overall performance even while suffering from one important 
drawback: it does not take into account the bank’s size and thereby rendering comparisons among 
different banking institutions and/or different time periods difficult.   
The use of ROA (and also of ROE) adjusts in accordance with the size of banks and thereby making 
possible those comparisons among institutions for the same or for different time periods. Thus, the 
ROA is a simple measure of bank profitability providing a good insight into just how well, or 
otherwise, the bank management is doing its job through reflecting the performance of the bank’s 
assets in terms of the profits returned.  
Appendix A presents the ROA obtained for our sample of the 27 EU member state banking 
institutions countries between 1996 and 2008. The results also demonstrate the clear difficulties faced 
by banking institutions in some important EU countries in 2008. For the years leading up to 2008, 
there are few negative results and only in some new EU member states and during some critical years 
in Germany’s reunification process. Nevertheless, generally speaking, for the time period between 
1996 and 2007, our ROA results reveal a general tendency towards rising profits generated by bank 
assets in most EU countries.  
 
Return on equity 
In spite of the recognition that the ROA ratio returns a clear measure of bank performance, for the 
banking industry, most analysts prefer to use return on equity (ROE, thus, the ratio of net income to 
bank equity) to judge not only the performances of individual banks but also of the entire banking 
sector. Bank shareholders pay particular attention to the relationship between bank earnings and their 
equity investment, which is susceptible to measurement by the ROE ratio.  
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Appendix B contains the results returned for ROE in our sample that confirm the clear difficulties 
encountered by banking institutions in some leading EU countries in 2008 and a few negative values 
for banking institutions in some new EU members and the reunified Germany. However, there is no 
clear trend in the rises and falls in the ROE results for the years before 2008.  On the contrary, these 
ROE results report clear oscillations in the ratio of bank earnings and shareholder equity investment 
across the 27 EU countries.  
 
Bank cost efficiency 
To measure bank efficiency we adopted the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a non-parametric 
method developed by, among others, Coelli et al. (1998), Thanassoulis (2001) and Thanassoulis et al. 
(2007). Here, we take the intermediation approach considering that total bank costs depend on three 
bank outputs: total loans, total securities and other earning assets; and also on three bank inputs: 
borrowed funds, physical capital and labour. Our sample comprises annual data from the consolidated 
accounts of commercial and saving banks from 27 EU countries between 1996 and 2008, sourced 
from the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD.   
Appendix C reports the obtained DEA yearly bank cost efficiency results. In spite of year-on-year 
oscillations, in many EU countries, there is a clear trend towards decreasing bank cost efficiency 
levels (particularly for some large countries such as Germany and France alongside other smaller 
countries including Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden and the Netherlands). On the 
other hand, for some of the new EU member states, there is a trend towards increasing bank cost 







3.2. Economic growth 
Economic growth will be represented by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) but also by the gross 
fixed capital formation, taking into account the importance of the fixed capital to create necessary 
conditions to economic growth. The used data were sourced from the Eurostat statistical database and 
defined in nominal terms (as were also defined the bank performance variables, sourced from the 
IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD). 
 
Gross domestic product 
In our estimations we apply per capita nominal GDP at market prices (Euro per inhabitant) sourced 
from the Eurostat statistical database. The data reported in Appendix D demonstrate that during the 
period considered nominal per capita GDP rose throughout the 27 EU countries, and grew at its fastest 
pace in countries with lower GDP levels (for instance, around five times more in Bulgaria and in the 
Czech Republic) even though this increased growth did not amount to eliminating the enormous 
discrepancies still persisting among the 27 countries.  
 
Gross fixed capital formation 
Appendix E presents the yearly 27 EU country nominal gross fixed capital formation expenditure 
levels. With few exceptions, and only for the years 2002 (in countries including Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Netherlands, Spain and Portugal) and 2008 (mostly in Greece, Ireland, Spain and the UK), 
there is a generalised rise in this expenditure in all countries and particularly clearly in the new EU 






3.3. Unit root tests 
The number of observations in our panel (27 countries x 13 annual observations) does not lend itself 
to the application of single-unit root tests for time series. Therefore, we opted for panel-unit root tests, 
which prove more appropriate to this case. These tests not only increase the power of unit root testing 
due to the observation span but also minimise the risks of structural breaks.  
From among the available panel unit root tests, we chose here to use the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) 
test and the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test. 
The Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) may be viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller test, or as an augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test, which include lags and the null hypothesis stems from the existence of non-
stationarity. This test is adequate for moderate size, heterogeneous panels and such as the panels 
applied in this paper with fixed effects, and assumes there is a common unit root process. The results 
reported in Appendix F enable us to reject the existence of the null hypothesis.  
The Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test estimates the t-test for unit roots in heterogeneous panels and 
allows for individual unit root processes. This involves applying the mean of the individual Dickey-
Fuller t-statistics to each panel unit and assumes that all series are non-stationary under the null 






4. Empirical results  
In our estimations, we applied the variables defined in the previous section to test the panel Granger 
causality relations between economic growth (more precisely, the GDP per capita and also the gross 
fixed capital formation) and bank performance (represented by the Return on Assets, ROA, and the 
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Return on Equity, ROE, ratios and also by bank cost efficiency level as measured through Data 
Envelopment Analysis, DEA).  
We opted to deploy both panel ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations and fixed-effects panel 
estimations, in keeping with Wooldridge (2002) and Baltagi (2008), among others and first present 
the results obtained for the causality running from bank performance to growth and then the inverse 
causality running from growth to bank performance. 
 
 
4.1. Causality running from bank performance to growth 
Table 1 feature the obtained results for the causality running from bank performance to economic 
growth generated by panel ordinary least square (OLS) robust estimations and panel fixed robust 
estimations.  
As regards GDP per capita, Tables 1-A, 1-B and 1-C report the specific influence of the variables 
representing bank performance (respectively, the ROA and ROE ratios and also DEA bank cost 
efficiency). In all situations, the results obtained confirm the positive effect of all these variables on 
GDP growth, and these effects are statistically strong at least for the first lags of bank performance 
variables.  
Simultaneously, and also as expected, as we are dealing with panel estimations, the R-squared values 
returned are not remarkable. Nevertheless, for the fixed-effects estimations, the R-squared obtained 
for “between” are not only relatively high but also always much higher than the R-squared “within”, 
revealing how for the panel considered, the cross-section evolution (“between” the countries) is 
always stronger than the time evolution (“within” the interval considered). 
 
We reach very similar conclusions in the second part of Table 1, which reports the results obtained 
for growth in gross fixed capital formation.  
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More precisely, in all situations, there is a clear and positive influence of ROA (Table 1-D), ROE 
(Table 1-E) and bank cost efficiency (Table 1-F) on the growth of the gross fixed capital formation, 
and these results are statistically stronger for the first lags of the bank performance variables. 
Furthermore, and also in line with the previous results, the R-squared values obtained enable us to 
conclude that the cross-section evolution between the 27 EU countries is more relevant in this panel 
than the time evolution during the interval considered (1996-2008). 
 
A more careful comparison of the information reported in Table 1 clearly demonstrates that the best 
results are obtained in Table 1 – F, demonstrating that with both robust OLS and panel-fixed robust 
estimations, bank cost efficiency exerts a statistically strong positive influence on the growth in gross 
fixed capital formation.  
These results reveal that Granger causality from bank efficiency to growth is particularly strong when 
growth is represented by gross fixed capital formation, confirming the position that well-functioning 
banking institutions do play an important role and not only in mobilising savings but also in 













TABLE 1 – CAUSALITY RUNNING FROM BANK PERFORMANCE TO ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
 
Table 1 - A - Dependent variable: Gross domestic product at market prices (Euro per inhabitant); explanatory 
variable: Return on assets (ROA) 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value
GDP per capita t-1 -.02102          -2.00          0.046 -.0137797    -1.36          0.187 
GDP per capita t-2 -.0093003      -1.42          0.156 -.0013958    -0.33          0.744 
Return on assets (ROA) t-1 .8580076         1.49          0.137 .8257388       2.31          0.029
Return on assets (ROA) t-2 .030947           0.08          0.934 -.0058706    -0.02          0.986 
Constant .070038         21.49          0.000 .0701304      532.72        0.000
  
R-squared:  = 0.0730 
R-squared:  within  = 0.0757 
between = 0.2929 
overall = 0.0686 
 F (4, 317) =    3.96 
(Prob. > F =  0.0038) 
F(4, 26)   =     27.82 
(Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
Number of observations 322 322 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.888955 0.819868 
 
Table 1 - B - Dependent variable: Gross domestic product at market prices (Euro per inhabitant); explanatory 
variable: Return on equity (ROE) 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value 
GDP per capita t-1 -.0215765      -2.00          0.046 -.014548      -1.48          0.151 
GDP per capita t-2 -.0093493      -1.43          0.153 -.0015179    -0.33          0.742 
Return on equity (ROE) t-1 .0769428         1.81          0.072 .0714988       2.49          0.020 
Return on equity (ROE)  t-2 .0167438         0.59          0.553 .0134006       0.51          0.614 
Constant .0697435       21.26          0.000 .0698698     288.58        0.000 
  
R-squared:  = 0.0752 
R-squared:  within  = 0.0756 
between = 0.2893 
overall = 0.0712 
 F (4,   317) =    4.50 
(Prob. > F =  0.0015) 
F (4,  26)    =     49.48 
(Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
Number of observations 322 322 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.093687 0.084899 
 
Table 1 - C - Dependent variable: Gross domestic product at market prices (Euro per inhabitant); explanatory 
variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA) 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value 
GDP per capita t-1 -.0289362       -2.92          0.004 -.0216277    -2.55          0.017 
GDP per capita t-2 -.011864        -1.44          0.152 -.0040334    -0.56          0.582 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1 .0500286         2.47           0.014 .0393857       1.71          0.100 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2 .0229764         1.36           0.173 .0134193       0.66          0.518 
Constant .0699159       21.88           0.000 .07013        287.42         0.000 
  
R-squared:  = 0.0810 
R-squared:  within  = 0.0679 
between = 0.2563 
overall = 0.0783 
 F (4,   317) = 4.45 
(Prob. > F =  0.0016) 
F (4,  26)            =      2.09 
(Prob. > F =  0.1114) 
Number of observations 322 322 




Table 1 - D -  Dependent variable: Gross fixed capital formation; explanatory variable: Return on assets (ROA) 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value
Gross fixed capital formation  t-1 -.0051933     -0.56          0.576 -.0001781    -0.02          0.986 
Gross fixed capital formation t-2 -.0237701     -2.18          0.030 -.0182414    -1.67          0.107 
Return on assets (ROA) t-1 1.156915        1.41          0.160 1.054623      1.35           0.190
Return on assets (ROA) t-2 .4841011        0.83          0.409 .4258303      0.82           0.418
Constant .0822218      15.42          0.000 .0822752    244.77         0.000
  
R-squared:  = 0.0560 
R-squared:  within  = 0.0449 
between = 0.3104 
overall = 0.0547 
 F (4,   317) =    2.22 
(Prob. > F =  0.0662) 
F (4,  26)      =      4.81 
(Prob. > F =  0.0040) 
Number of observations 322 322 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 1.641016 1.480533 
 
 
Table 1 - E - Dependent variable: Gross fixed capital formation; explanatory variable: Return on equity (ROE) 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value
Gross fixed capital formation t-1 -.0054185     -0.57          0.566 -.0005223    -0.05          0.957 
Gross fixed capital formation t-2 -.0226198     -2.03          0.043 -.017041      -1.49          0.147 
Return on equity (ROE) t-1 .1259699       1.84           0.067 .1132009       1.96          0.061
Return on equity (ROE) t-2 .0793229       1.80           0.073 .0738109       1.34          0.191
Constant .0816039      15.35          0.000 .0817264    167.77         0.000
  
R-squared:  = 0.0686 
R-squared:  within  = 0.0579 
between = 0.3577 
overall = 0.0672 
 F (4,   317) =    3.26 
(Prob. > F =  0.0121) 
F (4, 26)   =      7.54 
(Prob. > F =  0.0004) 
Number of observations 322 322 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.205293 0.187012 
 
Table 1 - F -  Dependent variable: Gross fixed capital formation; explanatory variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA) 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value
Gross fixed capital formation t-1 -.0124428     -2.02          0.044 -.0071564    -0.95          0.353 
Gross fixed capital formation t-2 -.0271697     -2.51          0.013 -.0217012    -2.55          0.017 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1 .1181437        4.20          0.000 .1068434       3.26          0.003
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2 .0637245        2.60          0.010 .0527886       1.94          0.064
Constant .0815758      15.80          0.000 .0817325    259.91         0.000
  
R-squared:  = 0.1091 
R-squared:  within  = 0.0956 
between = 0.2870 
overall = 0.1079 
 F  (4,   317) =    7.35 
(Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
F (4, 26)   =      4.82 
(Prob. > F =  0.0048) 
Number of observations 322 322 







4.2. Causality running from growth to bank performance  
The results returned for the causality running from economic growth to bank performance, and 
also applying panel OLS robust estimations and fixed-effects robust estimations, are detailed in 
Table 2. 
More precisely, in the first half of this table we report the results for the influence of GDP per 
capita growth on the three bank performance variables: on Return on Assets (Table 2 – A), on 
Return on Equity (Table 2 – B) and on bank cost efficiency (Table 2 – C). In the final section of 
Table 2 (that is, Table 2 – D, Table 2 – E and Table 2 – F),  we set out the results obtained for the 
influence of gross fixed capital formation on ROA, ROE and bank efficiency respectively. 
 
In all situations, the resulting R-squared values presented in Table 2 are much higher than those 
for the causality running from bank performance to growth reported in Table 1. Furthermore, and 
also contrary to Table 1, for the fixed-effects estimations we obtain a much stronger R-squared 
“within” result than that for the R-squared “between” and therefore reach the conclusion that for 
the causality running from growth to bank performance the time evolution (“within” the considered 
interval, 1996-2008) is much more relevant than the cross-section evolution (“between” the 27 EU 
countries included in the panel). 
In addition, for all the explanatory variables, the results obtained are statistically valid (and much 
stronger) for the second lags than for the first, confirming the relevance of time delays to this 
process as the effects of economic growth on bank performance are not immediate. 
 
The information generated allows for the conclusion that in spite of the oscillations between the 
first and the second lags, economic growth (GDP per capita and gross fixed capital formation) 
wields a generally positive influence on both the ROA and the ROE ratios as not only are the 
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results of the second lags positive and statistically relevant but also the joint-influence of the two 
lags under consideration, represented by the correspondent causality Granger coefficients, always 
proves positive. 
 
On the other hand, for the causality running from economic growth to bank cost efficiency, the 
results obtained when growth is proxied by GDP per capita (Table 2 – C) and when proxied by 
gross fixed capital formation (Table 2 – F), while not very strongly in statistical terms, generally 
turn out negative.  
To understand this possible non-alignment between economic growth and bank efficiency, we 
should recall that DEA efficiency is a relative measure, dependent on the chosen sample and, in 
our estimations, we considered that bank costs depend on the combinations of three bank outputs 
(total loans, total securities and other earning assets) and three bank inputs (borrowed funds, 
physical capital and labour).  
Hence, it would not prove difficult to accept that, for our panel of EU countries, over the time 



















TABLE 2 – CAUSALITY RUNNING FROM ECONOMIC GROWTH TO BANK 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Table 2-A - Dependent variable: Return on assets (ROA); explanatory variable: Gross domestic product at 
market prices (Euro per inhabitant) 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value 
Return on assets (ROA) t-1 -.3484563       -2.56         0.011 -.3473012      -4.00        0.000 
Return on assets (ROA) t-2 -.2684678       -3.06         0.002 -.2684267    -10.54        0.000 
GDP per capita t-1 -.0038217       -1.46         0.146 -.0035203      -1.27        0.214 
GDP per capita t-2 .0088773          2.75         0.006 .0091956         2.84        0.009 
Constant -.0001383       -0.32         0.752 -.0001357      -2.54        0.017 
  
R-squared:  = 0.4224 
R-squared:  within  = 0.4285 
between = 0.1189 
overall = 0.4221 
 F (4,   317) =    5.99 
(Prob. > F =  0.0001) 
F (4,  26)     =     28.85 
(Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
Number of observations 322 322 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.005056 0.005675 
 
Table 2-B - Dependent variable: Return on equity (ROE); explanatory variable: Gross domestic product at 
market prices (Euro per inhabitant) 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value 
Return on equity (ROE) t-1 -.3498541      -1.94          0.053 -.3495838    -4.00          0.000 
Return on equity (ROE) t-2 -.230413        -2.05          0.041 -.2290209    -9.01          0.000 
GDP per capita  t-1 -.0222006      -1.06          0.290 -.0180974    -0.96          0.348 
GDP per capita t-2 .0895546         2.29          0.023 .0942303       2.50          0.019 
Constant -.0029979      -0.43          0.667 -.0029558    -3.00          0.006 
  
R-squared:  = 0.2805 
R-squared:  within  = 0.2874 
between = 0.0386 
overall = 0.2802 
 F (4,   317) =    4.72 
(Prob. > F =  0.0010) 
F (4,  26)   =     22.91 
(Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
Number of observations 322 322 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.067354 0.076133 
 
Table 2 - C - Dependent variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA); explanatory variable: Gross domestic product at 
market prices (Euro per inhabitant) 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1 -.0861809      -1.26          0.210 -.1111668    -2.67          0.013 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2 -.1639728      -1.89          0.060 -.1857853    -3.43          0.002 
GDP per capita t-1 -.001682        -0.05          0.958 .007362         0.27          0.786
GDP per capita t-2 -.0931096      -1.75          0.082 -.0844469    -1.64          0.112 
Constant -.0051778      -0.61   0.540 -.0047732   -10.53         0.000 
  
R-squared:  = 0.1181 
R-squared:  within  = 0.1282 
between = 0.0047 
overall = 0.1157 
 F (4,   317) =    2.53 
(Prob. > F =  0.0408) 
F (4, 26)    =   10.85 
(Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
Number of observations 322 322 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT -0.094792 -0.077085 
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Table 2 - D - Dependent variable: Return on assets (ROA); explanatory variable: Gross fixed capital formation 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value
Return on assets (ROA) t-1 -.3531667     -2.48          0.014 -.3514223     -3.90         0.001 
Return on assets (ROA) t-2 -.3034327     -3.15          0.002 -.3024296     -8.80         0.000 
Gross fixed capital formation t-1 -.0017174     -1.27          0.205 -.0014962     -1.01         0.321 
Gross fixed capital formation t-2 .0060029        2.73          0.007 .0062315        2.70         0.012
Constant -.0001518     -0.35          0.730 -.0001523     -3.41         0.002 
  
R-squared:  = 0.4322 
R-squared:  within  = 0.4384 
between = 0.1598 
overall = 0.4319 
 F (4,   317) =    5.58 
(Prob. > F =  0.0002) 
F (4,  26)         =     42.96 
(Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
Number of observations 322 322 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.004286 0.004735 
 
Table 2 - E - Dependent variable: Return on equity (ROE); explanatory variable: Gross fixed capital formation 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t| 
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value
Return on equity (ROE) t-1 -.3541566     -2.02          0.044 -.3517636    -3.84          0.001 
Return on equity (ROE) t-2 -.2484065     -2.25          0.025 -.2452814    -8.67          0.000 
Gross fixed capital formation t-1 -.0092782     -0.86          0.391 -.0055061    -0.56          0.579 
Gross fixed capital formation t-2 .0665872        2.38          0.018 .0705989       2.46          0.021
Constant -.00316         -0.46          0.647 -.0031785    -3.61          0.001 
  
R-squared:  = 0.3129 
R-squared:  within  = 0.3224 
between = 0.0287 
overall = 0.3123 
 F (4,   317) =    4.88 
(Prob. > F =  0.0008) 
F (4,  26)    =     30.38 
(Prob. > F =  0.0000) 
Number of observations 322 322 
GRANGER COEFFICIENT 0.057309 0.065093 
 
Table 2 - F - Dependent variable: Cost Efficiency (DEA); explanatory variable: Gross fixed capital formation 
 
 OLS robust 
coef.             t              P>|t|
Fixed-effects robust 
coef.             t               P-value
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-1 -.0866303     -1.26          0.208 -.1144128     -2.68         0.013 
Cost Efficiency (DEA) t-2 -.1592579     -1.69          0.091 -.1824269     -2.87         0.008 
Gross fixed capital formation t-1 -.0026062     -0.17          0.864 -.0001657     -0.01         0.991 
Gross fixed capital formation t-2 -.0414804     -1.35          0.177 -.0396671     -1.30         0.205 
Constant -.00474         -0.54          0.588 -.004398       -9.82         0.000 
  
R-squared:  = 0.0829 
R-squared:  within  = 0.1000 
between = 0.0584 
overall = 0.0818 
 F (4,   317) =    2.39 
(Prob. > F =  0.0507) 
F (4,  26)  =      9.02 
(Prob. > F =  0.0001) 
Number of observations 322 322 








4.3. Granger coefficients and F-tests results  
In Table 3, we present a summary of the values obtained with OLS robust and fixed-effects robust 
estimations for the causality Granger coefficients and the F tests (always supposing the joint 
hypothesis 1 = 2 = 0). In Part I of Table 3 we put forward the results for causality running from 
bank performance to economic growth before the results for inverse causality, from growth to bank 
performance, in Part II. 
 
The F-test results underpin the conclusion that, in general, our estimations are statistically 
significant for bi-directional causality relations between growth and bank performance. 
 
The reported values of the Granger coefficients clearly confirm the positive causality between 
bank performance (here represented by the ROA and ROE ratios and bank cost efficiency) and 
economic growth. These results are in line with the literature defending how the best financial 
practices nurture economic growth (for instance, recently, Greenwood et al. 2013) and very 
particularly with the conclusions from such authors as Koetter and Wedow (2010) or Hasan et al. 
(2009), who have analysed the importance of bank efficiency to growth in some EU countries for 
time intervals ranging from the mid-1990s through to the mid-2000s.  
 
On the other hand, for causality running from economic growth to bank performance, the Granger 
coefficient results presented in the second part of Table 3 are not unanimous. However, there is no 
doubt that growth enhances the rise in bank ROA (more precisely, the ratio between net bank 
income and total assets) and also of bank ROE (thus, the ratio between net income and bank 
equity). Hence, for these two ratios, and also taking into account the results reported in the first 
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section of Table 3, we may conclude in favour of clear and positive bi-directional panel Granger 
causality between growth and bank performance. 
 
However, as regards the influence of economic growth on bank efficiency, the Granger coefficients 
presented in Table 3 do not provide for any conclusion as to growth bringing about an increase in 
bank efficiency.   
However, this does not prove unusual when taking into consideration not only the definition of 
DEA bank cost efficiency but also the variety of conclusions about the levels of importance of 
economic growth to financial development reported by authors including Hassan et al. (2011), 



















TABLE 3 – GRANGER COEFFICIENTS AND F-TESTS RESULTS 
Part I Part II 
 OLS robust Fixed effects
robust 
 OLS robust Fixed effects
robust 
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5. Conclusions  
This paper contributes towards the debate on the causality relationship between bank 
performance and economic growth by applying a panel Granger causality approach to 27 
European Union countries for the time period between 1996 and 2008. 
The proxies for bank performance are the Return on Assets (ROA) and the Return on Equity (ROE) 
ratios in conjunction with bank cost efficiency, measured by the Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) non-parametric approach. Furthermore, to represent economic growth, we opt not only to 
deploy GDP per capita but also gross fixed capital formation.    
The results obtained are in line with the conclusions reached by those defending how good 
financial practices help foster economic growth (among others, Koetter and Wedow, 2010; Hasan 
et al., 2009; Hassan et al., 2011; Greenwood et al., 2013). Our evidence clearly supports the 
causality running from bank performance to economic growth as, in all situations, we report the 
positive influence of ROA, the ROE and DEA bank cost efficiency on both per capita GDP and 
on gross fixed capital formation growth. 
Additionally, for the opposite causality, running from economic growth to bank performance, there 
is clear evidence that both GDP per capita and growth in gross fixed capital formation contribute 
positively to the ROA and ROE ratios. These results underpin the conclusion that, whenever 
applying these two proxies for bank performance, we obtain positive bi-directional panel Granger 
causality between economic growth and bank performance. 
However, when approaching bank performance according to DEA bank cost efficiency, we are 
then unable to confirm this positive bi-directional relationship as while there is evidence that bank 
cost efficiency does enhance economic growth, there is no clear statistic evidence on whether per 
capita GDP and growth in gross fixed capital formation growth result in an increase in bank cost 
efficiency levels.  
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The explanation for these results, on the one hand, stems both from the specific characteristics of 
DEA bank cost efficiency and also from the fact that bank efficiency always depends not only on 
the macroeconomic environment prevailing but also on the ongoing management decisions at 
banking institutions. From another perspective, our results fall within the framework of the 
controversial factors and levels of contribution of economic growth to financial development 
identified in different countries and regions and recently underlined by such authors as Hassan et 
al. (2011), Bangake and Eggoh (2011) and Abdelhafidh (2013). 
As policy implications to the conclusions presented, we would underline the important role of bank 
performance as a condition favourable to the financing of gross fixed capital formation and 
fostering economic growth in European Union member states from at least the mid-1990s and 
through to the onset of the recent financial crisis. Furthermore, the subsequent crisis has also 
clearly demonstrated that problems in the EU banking sector lowered its capacity to finance 
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Appendix A – Return on assets (ROA)  
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria 0.0026 0.00345 0.00286 0.00403 0.00419 0.00325 0.00252 0.00348 0.00375 0.00462 0.00902 0.00586 -0.00142 
Belgium 0.00302 0.00302 0.00287 0.00468 0.0057 0.00555 0.00387 0.00456 0.00431 0.00461 0.00684 0.00334 -0.01741 
Bulgaria 0.05388 0.0967 0.00694 0.01875 0.02756 0.0168 0.01766 0.02099 0.01911 0.02024 0.01917 0.02198 0.02267 
Cyprus 0.00389 0.00377 0.00541 0.01176 0.01105 0.00705 -0.00211 -0.0002 0.00202 0.00476 0.00888 0.01536 0.0116 
Czech Rep. 0.00324 -0.00751 -0.00996 -0.00912 0.00383 0.00149 0.01318 0.01391 0.01344 0.01442 0.01357 0.0137 0.01222 
Denmark 0.00834 0.00804 0.0072 0.00615 0.00603 0.00511 0.00455 0.00656 0.00565 0.00669 0.00719 0.00557 -0.00063 
Estonia 0.02395 0.02263 -0.01593 0.01879 0.0171 0.02385 0.02386 0.02296 0.02127 0.01772 0.01719 0.02002 0.01383 
Finland  0.00365 0.00862 0.00448 0.00815 0.01414 0.01517 0.00474 0.01658 0.00773 0.00868 0.00884 0.00965 0.00502 
France 0.00073 0.00165 0.00269 0.00314 0.00481 0.00388 0.00349 0.00386 0.00497 0.00443 0.00571 0.00282 -0.00105 
Germany 0.00231 0.00222 0.00377 0.00219 0.00399 -0.00018 -0.0019 -0.00203 0.00051 0.00269 0.00359 0.00388 -0.00223 
Greece 0.00559 0.00606 0.00721 0.02243 0.0131 0.00954 0.00489 0.00747 0.00536 0.00921 0.00834 0.01075 0.0043 
Hungary 0.01177 0.01083 -0.00029 0.00374 0.0114 0.0136 0.01482 0.01735 0.02394 0.01839 0.01721 0.01623 0.01344 
Ireland 0.00687 0.00695 0.00766 0.00733 0.006 0.00464 0.00439 0.00522 0.00548 0.00551 0.0063 0.00611 0.0008 
Italy 0.00201 0.00071 0.00462 0.00634 0.00728 0.00536 0.00433 0.00505 0.00608 0.00727 0.00775 0.00641 0.00419 
Latvia 0.03149 0.02642 -0.06331 0.00926 0.01632 0.01551 0.01397 0.01374 0.01609 0.01839 0.01712 0.01735 0.00019 
Lithuania -0.00612 0.00592 0.01042 0.01309 0.00778 0.00381 0.00829 0.01133 0.00999 0.00874 0.01178 0.01446 0.00947 
Luxembourg 0.00426 0.00419 0.00543 0.00405 0.00469 0.00505 0.00516 0.00544 0.00493 0.00574 0.00857 0.00627 0.00262 
Malta 0.00857 0.00941 0.00772 0.00757 0.01091 0.00818 0.00659 0.00876 0.01008 0.01233 0.01164 0.00941 -0.00227 
Netherlands 0.00689 0.00675 0.00682 0.0067 0.00834 0.00707 0.00453 0.0061 0.00509 0.00688 0.00686 0.00805 -0.00883 
Poland 0.0217 0.01648 0.00751 0.0107 0.01053 0.00763 0.00429 0.00355 0.01339 0.01722 0.0171 0.01973 0.016 
Portugal 0.00586 0.00756 0.0075 0.0079 0.00914 0.00725 0.00654 0.00683 0.00509 0.00652 0.00755 0.00721 0.00288 
Romania 0.00241 0.00074 -0.009 0.02758 0.02114 0.02552 0.01705 0.01196 0.02172 0.01683 0.01594 0.0131 0.0202 
Slovakia 0.00182 -0.00696 -0.02133 0.01443 0.0153 0.01043 0.01232 0.0131 0.01082 0.00999 0.01105 0.0115 0.00873 
Slovenia 0.01058 0.00956 0.01151 0.00645 0.01095 0.00511 0.00706 0.00615 0.00767 0.0073 0.00899 0.00929 0.00439 
Spain 0.00619 0.00698 0.00783 0.00803 0.00826 0.00808 0.00764 0.00773 0.00747 0.00773 0.0089 0.00978 0.0069 
Sweden 0.00945 0.00487 0.00717 0.00674 0.00756 0.00888 0.0045 0.00582 0.00885 0.00683 0.00677 0.00658 0.00454 
UK 0.00674 0.00597 0.00834 0.00793 0.00794 0.0071 0.00622 0.00761 0.00744 0.00537 0.00547 0.00592 -0.00009 
 
This appendix presents the obtained yearly EU country returns on assets (ROA = net income/assets). 
Source: own calculations with data sourced from the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD (annual data from the 

















Appendix B – Return on equity (ROE)  
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria 0.07012 0.08268 0.0717 0.10285 0.1149 0.08425 0.06325 0.07434 0.08538 0.09875 0.16321 0.09107 -0.02699 
Belgium 0.10145 0.09688 0.08235 0.13048 0.1604 0.17411 0.10844 0.13201 0.13042 0.15421 0.21715 0.07971 -0.52826 
Bulgaria 0.43574 0.64501 0.04117 0.10237 0.15356 0.11381 0.12309 0.14553 0.16157 0.17414 0.17626 0.19653 0.18565 
Cyprus 0.06761 0.0682 0.0941 0.15086 0.11837 0.08053 -0.02424 -0.00296 0.03704 0.09008 0.11125 0.15764 0.13239 
Czech Rep. 0.04608 -0.11873 -0.15207 -0.14085 0.05733 0.02374 0.18834 0.18377 0.16247 0.17876 0.17501 0.20417 0.14958 
Denmark 0.13266 0.14013 0.12551 0.11145 0.11017 0.10189 0.09585 0.13581 0.12381 0.13881 0.13917 0.11885 -0.01584 
Estonia 0.26234 0.25425 -0.10693 0.12701 0.12888 0.18962 0.18476 0.18313 0.20602 0.20292 0.22375 0.25453 0.14777 
Finland  0.07584 0.1886 0.09463 0.16671 0.22149 0.23956 0.07312 0.17018 0.08563 0.1005 0.0965 0.13678 0.09833 
France 0.02058 0.0491 0.07574 0.08075 0.12459 0.10213 0.08729 0.09581 0.13134 0.12659 0.15251 0.08743 -0.03695 
Germany 0.0647 0.06262 0.10468 0.06207 0.10063 -0.00403 -0.0478 -0.05344 0.0154 0.07803 0.10829 0.11397 -0.07949 
Greece 0.12395 0.12592 0.12222 0.21942 0.15107 0.12468 0.07597 0.11189 0.08771 0.13803 0.11176 0.1466 0.0771 
Hungary 0.20067 0.14938 -0.00464 0.05168 0.14947 0.17457 0.17517 0.19713 0.2474 0.21231 0.189 0.18294 0.16369 
Ireland 0.10778 0.11656 0.12663 0.12916 0.09938 0.09332 0.10073 0.13648 0.13956 0.1512 0.1691 0.16367 0.0252 
Italy 0.03248 0.01212 0.07539 0.10621 0.12109 0.08584 0.06809 0.07376 0.09107 0.09731 0.11052 0.07958 0.05588 
Latvia 0.2347 0.21165 -0.79227 0.09451 0.18878 0.16992 0.15678 0.15339 0.18947 0.22583 0.21638 0.20573 0.0024 
Lithuania -0.0944 0.06697 0.08455 0.10784 0.06946 0.03556 0.07332 0.1123 0.11137 0.11295 0.16206 0.19346 0.11498 
Luxembourg 0.13237 0.13567 0.15398 0.11146 0.12008 0.12174 0.11354 0.12027 0.10508 0.12224 0.17984 0.13193 0.05362 
Malta 0.15712 0.16442 0.10927 0.10722 0.1479 0.1102 0.08934 0.05892 0.07043 0.09368 0.08918 0.08777 -0.02371 
Netherlands 0.1077 0.11702 0.12257 0.13324 0.14828 0.13617 0.0971 0.13562 0.15143 0.16493 0.166 0.16065 -0.25869 
Poland 0.24709 0.1869 0.08864 0.12328 0.11412 0.08001 0.04391 0.03965 0.12701 0.16575 0.16663 0.19204 0.17613 
Portugal 0.09731 0.12965 0.11553 0.12514 0.16528 0.13154 0.10931 0.10743 0.08646 0.11704 0.11874 0.11894 0.05323 
Romania 0.03886 0.00847 -0.07063 0.17422 0.12891 0.14468 0.10438 0.08074 0.1699 0.15345 0.16463 0.15455 0.22711 
Slovakia 0.03798 -0.14916 -0.82112 0.23768 0.21061 0.13332 0.13958 0.14107 0.12162 0.12898 0.15206 0.15506 0.11975 
Slovenia 0.09374 0.08089 0.11398 0.06774 0.11554 0.05954 0.08655 0.07417 0.09183 0.09395 0.11265 0.11967 0.05467 
Spain 0.10724 0.1181 0.12561 0.12915 0.11746 0.1159 0.1095 0.11587 0.10342 0.11944 0.13925 0.15256 0.11552 
Sweden 0.23566 0.12267 0.19192 0.16768 0.20256 0.22153 0.115 0.13852 0.20442 0.16303 0.16075 0.16533 0.1289 
UK 0.14577 0.12942 0.16932 0.14853 0.14254 0.12455 0.11284 0.13373 0.15684 0.14866 0.15404 0.15892 -0.00381 
 
This appendix presents the obtained yearly EU country returns on equity (ROE = net income/equity). 
Source: own calculations with data sourced from the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD (annual data from the 














Appendix C – Yearly Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) cost efficiency measures of the 
EU member states 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria 0.702 0.629 0.595 0.760 0.720 0.616 0.643 0.694 0.676 0.707 0.662 0.678 0.715 
Belgium 0.950 0.887 0.903 0.983 0.826 0.911 0.793 0.958 0.594 0.819 0.672 0.463 0.478 
Bulgaria 0.149 0.270 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.970 0.937 0.832 1.000 1.000 0.915 
Cyprus 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.914 0.725 0.695 0.679 0.837 0.800 0.937 
Czech Rep. 0.945 0.803 0.579 0.632 0.859 0.741 0.681 0.716 0.838 0.897 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Denmark 0.926 0.853 0.830 0.785 0.668 0.525 0.607 0.776 0.780 0.734 0.928 0.722 0.536 
Estonia 1.000 0.864 0.730 0.647 0.717 0.765 0.621 0.587 0.760 0.777 0.893 0.711 0.669 
Finland  0.783 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.737 1.000 0.687 0.677 1.000 0.905 1.000 0.845 0.579 
France 0.818 0.699 0.687 0.739 0.552 0.547 0.578 0.576 0.531 0.577 0.606 0.597 0.712 
Germany 0.948 0.889 1.000 0.981 0.772 0.762 0.887 0.934 0.956 0.776 0.821 0.699 0.606 
Greece 0.754 0.685 0.643 0.604 0.734 0.781 0.949 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.967 0.991 
Hungary 0.334 0.298 0.365 0.367 0.539 0.504 0.402 0.485 0.434 0.433 0.523 0.500 0.495 
Ireland 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.951 1.000 1.000 0.849 0.959 
Italy 1.000 0.872 1.000 1.000 0.975 0.802 0.921 0.924 1.000 0.958 0.984 0.741 0.740 
Latvia 1.000 1.000 0.990 1.000 1.000 0.947 0.885 0.910 0.991 0.827 0.839 0.721 0.729 
Lithuania 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.900 0.778 
Luxembourg 0.879 0.690 0.730 0.696 0.654 0.508 0.564 0.697 0.673 0.757 0.523 0.544 0.524 
Malta 1.000 0.911 0.953 0.888 0.932 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Netherlands 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.874 0.764 0.759 0.748 0.852 0.822 0.779 0.821 0.882 0.564 
Poland 0.700 0.591 0.708 0.596 0.597 0.604 0.528 0.593 0.616 0.605 0.985 1.000 0.928 
Portugal 0.894 0.808 0.836 1.000 0.824 0.638 0.538 0.438 0.512 0.562 0.641 0.599 0.584 
Romania 0.612 0.596 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.986 0.925 0.886 0.998 0.855 
Slovakia 1.000 0.823 0.596 0.613 0.639 0.658 0.715 0.753 0.833 0.839 0.953 0.902 1.000 
Slovenia 0.803 0.732 0.712 0.868 0.856 0.842 0.675 0.620 0.585 0.808 0.855 0.873 0.809 
Spain 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.997 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Sweden 0.632 0.675 0.708 0.724 0.514 0.638 0.677 0.695 0.589 0.626 0.695 0.509 0.440 
UK 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
This Appendix presents the cost efficiency results obtained by DEA.   
 
Following Coelli et al. (1998),  Thanassoulis (2001) and  Thanassoulis et al. (2007), we can assume that at 
any time t, there are N decision-making units (DMUs) that consume a set of X inputs (X = x1, x2, ..., xk) to 
produce a set of Y outputs (Y = y1, y2, ..., ym), thus obtaining the DEA input-oriented efficiency measure 

































The DEA approach provides, for every i decision-making unit (DMU, here every country’s banking sector), 
a scalar efficiency score (i   1). When i = 1, the DMU lies on the efficient frontier and is considered an 
efficient unit. On the contrary, when i < 1, the DMU lies below the efficient frontier and is considered an 
inefficient unit; moreover, (1- i) always represents a measurement of the inefficiency of the respective 
unit.  
 
For the DEA estimates, we apply three variables as outputs: the total loans (natural logarithm of the loans), 
the total securities (natural logarithm of the total securities) and the other earning assets (natural logarithm 
of the difference between the total earning assets and the total loans);  and three variables as inputs: the 
price of borrowed funds (natural logarithm of the ratio between interest expense and the sum of deposits), 
the price of physical capital (natural logarithm of the ratio between non-interest expenses and fixed assets) 
and the price of labour (natural logarithm of the ratio between personnel expenses and the number of 
employees). 
 
The data are sourced from the IBCA-BankScope 2008 CD and the sample comprises annual data from the 





Appendix D – Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria 23200 23000 23900 24900 26000 26600 27300 27700 28700 29800 31300 33000 33900 
Belgium 21400 21700 22400 23400 24600 25300 26000 26600 28000 29000 30200 31600 32299 
Bulgaria 900 1100 1400 1500 1700 2000 2200 2400 2600 3000 3400 4000 4600 
Cyprus 11000 11600 12400 13300 14300 15300 15600 16100 17000 17900 19000 20300 21600 
Czech Rep. 5000 5100 5600 5700 6200 7000 8200 8300 9000 10200 11500 12800 14800 
Denmark 27600 28500 29300 30700 32500 33500 34400 35000 36500 38300 40200 41700 42500 
Estonia 2600 3200 3600 3900 4500 5100 5700 6400 7200 8300 10000 12000 12200 
Finland  19700 21100 22500 23700 25500 26800 27600 27900 29100 30000 31500 34000 34900 
France 20800 21000 2900 22700 23700 24500 25000 25600 26500 27300 28400 29600 30100 
Germany 23400 23200 23700 24400 24900 25500 25900 26000 26600 27000 28100 29500 30100 
Greece 10200 11100 11300 12100 12600 13400 14300 15600 16700 17400 18700 19900 20700 
Hungary 3500 4000 4200 4400 4900 5800 6900 7300 8100 8800 8900 9900 10500 
Ireland 16300 19800 21400 24300 27800 30600 33400 35300 37000 39300 41800 43500 40500 
Italy 17400 18500 19100 19800 21000 22000 22800 23300 24000 24500 25300 26200 26300 
Latvia 1800 2300 2500 2900 3600 3900 4200 4300 4800 5600 7000 9200 10100 
Lithuania 1800 2500 2800 2900 3600 3900 4400 4800 5300 6100 7100 8500 9700 
Luxembourg 39200 39000 40700 46200 50400 51100 53800 57200 60000 65200 71800 78100 80800 
Malta 7600 8400 8800 9400 11000 11100 11500 11400 11300 11900 12500 13300 14200 
Netherlands 21200 21900 22900 24400 26300 27900 28800 29400 30200 31500 33100 34900 36200 
Poland 3200 3600 4000 4100 4900 5600 5500 5000 5300 6400 7100 8200 9500 
Portugal 9500 10100 10800 11600 12400 13000 13500 13700 14200 14600 15100 16000 16200 
Romania 1300 1400 1600 1500 1800 2000 2200 2400 2800 3700 4500 5800 6500 
Slovakia 3100 3500 3700 3600 4100 4400 4800 5500 6300 7100 8300 10200 11900 
Slovenia 8400 9100 9800 10500 10800 11500 12300 12900 13600 14400 15500 17100 18400 
Spain 12400 12800 13500 14500 15600 16700 17700 18600 19700 21000 22400 23500 23900 
Sweden 24600 25300 25700 27400 30200 28500 29900 31100 32400 33000 35000 36900 36100 
UK 16500 20600 22200 24000 27200 27800 28800 27600 29600 30500 32200 33700 29300 
 
This appendix sets out the yearly EU countries’ nominal GDP per capita (market prices, Euro per 


















Appendix E – Gross fixed capital formation  
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Austria 45057.6 44463.2 46157.2 47216.8 50474.2 50443.9 48583.4 51314.5 52301.9 53737.7 55215.6 58772.4 61141.4 
Belgium 43720.6 45300.9 47227.3 49710.0 53469.0 54241.0 51368.0 52185.0 57880.0 62738.0 66923.0 72956.0 77395.0 
Bulgaria 1071.6 1011.9 1482.8 1868.3 2215.3 2841.9 3109.1 3492.4 4151.4 5988.0 7310.3 8827.0 11904.4 
Cyprus 1454.9 1454.4 1597.0 1616.0 1710.5 1808.3 2019.1 2071.3 2413.2 2637.4 3023.2 3516.1 3936.3 
Czech Rep. 16375.5 15713.4 16295.3 16097.0 18323.8 20402.4 22951.6 22629.5 23809.0 27016.1 30349.2 35641.0 41336.6 
Denmark 27000.0 29476.3 31718.4 32297.4 35028.6 35430.5 36182.4 36313.9 38030.3 40476.3 47373.4 49485.7 49457.9 
Estonia 983.2 1255.2 1519.8 1318.7 1582.7 1842.2 2307.7 2751.9 2989.8 3586.4 4817.4 5710.3 4846.6 
Finland  18228.4 20352.8 22627.0 23957.0 26481.0 28095.0 26811.0 27562.0 29439.0 31566.0 33144.0 38338.0 39759.0 
France 214026.8 212078.5 227882.9 249333.4 271953.3 282432.5 281088.5 290656.5 309190.8 332318.9 360376.1 394621.6 411879.0 
Germany 409481.3 400420.3 411293.5 426980.0 439550.0 421740.0 391800.0 381950.0 381790.0 384450.0 417820.0 447880.0 460740.0 
Greece (*) 23713.1 25918.0 26360.6 28511.0 29806.1 31665.2 35211.4 40164.8 40788.3 40020.1 49508.4 53444.8 51568.1 
Hungary 7896.0 9033.9 9884.0 10813.3 12263.0 13891.7 16461.1 16584.0 18651.2 20218.9 19480.9 21659.8 22901.6 
Ireland 11062.4 14484.1 17098.1 21046.8 24439.1 26330.8 28285.5 31590.8 36653.6 43521.6 48253.7 48444.4 39427.7 
Italy 187950.7 199096.1 209751.0 221299.1 245518.7 257682.0 274571.1 275257.6 288429.0 300765.5 319061.9 333532.7 330649.4 
Latvia 732.9 930.6 1483.5 1566.5 2071.0 2334.2 2378.3 2451.7 3091.7 4011.8 5265.7 7160.8 6787.5 
Lithuania 1358.9 1994.9 2391.2 2254.7 2347.0 2767.5 3084.0 3509.8 4089.1 4801.4 6093.0 8085.9 8216.5 
Luxembourg 3264.4 3548.3 3770.2 4669.8 4572.7 5109.6 5419.5 5739.4 5904.1 6211.8 6510.8 7775.9 8172.6 
Malta 668.8 698.2 778.6 814.0 965.0 881.5 728.6 873.8 885.8 1048.7 1120.6 1181.6 993.7 
Netherlands 71216.5 74876.9 79882.7 88383.0 91652.0 94673.0 92862.0 92848.0 92426.0 97016.0 106373.0 114340.0 121849.0 
Poland 24448.9 31080.7 36939.1 38429.8 44094.4 43919.6 39267.9 34948.2 36926.3 44538.9 53468.5 67058.4 80836.5 
Portugal 22538.2 26311.0 29676.8 32340.8 35238.4 36268.1 35978.1 33846.6 34699.9 35412.8 35890.1 37629.1 38634.4 
Romania 6486.7 6698.3 6802.3 5939.1 7652.5 9295.3 10350.8 11317.2 13293.2 18925.3 25036.0 37671.4 44609.6 
Slovakia 5288.6 6389.9 7126.2 5661.3 5687.0 6721.2 7108.3 7297.9 8156.6 10216.1 11803.8 14357.4 15973.6 
Slovenia 3745.1 4293.9 4834.6 5537.3 5647.6 5711.3 5735.3 6229.9 6805.1 7296.5 8236.1 9603.6 10729.7 
Spain 105022.0 110323.1 123739.4 142462.0 162806.0 176967.0 191715.0 213020.0 236051.0 267444.0 301263.0 323216.0 312046.0 
Sweden 35227.6 35254.4 37786.7 42442.0 48197.9 45509.6 46289.3 46984.3 49676.2 53403.6 59550.7 66157.6 66749.2 
UK 160170.1 200510.3 231166.7 245690.3 274107.4 276239.4 287093.5 269886.8 295332.0 306700.8 333228.7 365368.1 303114.5 
 
(*) For the period 1996-1999, the Greek data were not available. We assumed that the gross fixed 
capital formation grew in line with Gross Domestic Product at market prices (millions of ECUs) and 
calculated the missing values backward. 
 
This appendix presents the yearly EU countries’ nominal gross fixed capital formation, millions of euro 
(from 1.1.1999)/Millions of ECU (up to 31.12.1998). 
 




























Variables t-star P > t 
First difference of the return on assets (ROA) ratio -22.27852 0.0000 
First difference of the return on equity (ROE) ratio -18.01915 0.0000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of the DEA bank cost efficiency -13.66342 0.0000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of GDP  -12.73790 0.0000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of gross fixed capital formation -9.74921 0.0000 
 
 
This appendix presents the results obtained with the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test, which may be 
viewed as a pooled Dickey-Fuller test, or as an augmented Dickey-Fuller test when lags are included, 
with the null hypothesis being the existence of non-stationarity. 








1   
Where: 
i=1,…N = cross-units of the panel 
t=1,…T = time series observations 
L=1,…,P = lag orders 
dmt = vector of deterministic variables , with m= corresponding vector of coefficients for a 
particular model (m = 1,2,3) 




Appendix G – Panel unit root Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test  
 
 
Variables W[t-bar]   P-value 
First difference of the return on assets (ROA) ratio -16.681 0.000 
First difference of the return on equity (ROE) ratio -13.173 0.000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of DEA bank cost efficiency -9.679 0.000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of GDP  -9.047 0.000 
First difference of the natural logarithm of gross fixed capital formation -7.365 0.000 
 
This appendix features the results returned by the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test, which allows for 
individual unit root processes. The core equation, presented with the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test, is 








1   
Where =1- and now i may vary across cross-sections. The null hypothesis is now H0:  = 0, for all 
i. The alternative, H1, considers that at least some of the individual processes might be stationary, thus:  
 i = 0, for a sub-sample of the cross units ( i = 1, …, Nj) 
 i < 0, for the rest of the cross units ( i = Nj, Nj+1, … N) 
